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Abstract  
This paper examines whether teams with winning records that employ analytic decision makers 
see a higher increase in win percentage after in-season player acquisitions versus teams that 
employ non-analytic decision makers. This was accomplished through analyzing the in-season 
player acquisition data from the MLB and NBA over the last four completed seasons through 
descriptive and inferential statistics. There was not a significant difference between the two 
groups in average win percentage after total acquisitions, trades, or signings. Using inferential 
tests we found no statistical significance between the type of decision maker, and the difference 
in win percentage after an acquisition. 
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Analytic Decision Makers Versus Non-Analytic Decision Makers and Their Effect on Win 
Percentage after In-season Player Acquisitions 
In recent years the debate between sports figures over analytics has become more public. 
TNT analyst Charles Barkley recently received a social-media barb from analytic general 
manager Daryl Morey, and returned fire with a vengeance by calling the Houston Rockets GM 
"one of those idiots who believes in analytics," (“Barkley Rips Rockets’ GM,” 2015). The battle 
between analytic and nonanalytic minds in sport will continue for the for seeable future. The 
purpose of this study is to see if analytic decision makers of MLB and NBA teams have better 
results in terms of win percentage after a player acquisition than non-analytic decision makers. 
More and more professional teams are beginning to employ analytic decision makers, but some 
teams without analytic decision makers still achieve desirable results following the tried and true 
methods of qualitative player analysis based on personal experience or intangible factors. In this 
study, we will compare the difference in win percentage after a player acquisition (trade or 
signing) between teams with analytic decision makers and those without to see if having analytic 
decision makers leads to better results following player acquisitions. We will also investigate 
whether the analytic decision makers make more acquisitions than non-analytic decision makers 
each season to see if the quantity of acquisitions made plays a role for either type of decision 
maker. 
Literature Review 
Analytics based on player performance have become increasingly popular in the last 
decade, however the practice of using non-traditional, or advanced statistics, started in the 1970s 
when Bill James coined the term “sabermetrics,” which “represents an analysis of the game of 
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baseball using detailed performance rather than qualitative methods” based on simple statistics 
such as batting average (Beneventano, Berger, & Weinberg, 2012, p. 67). Sabermetrics do not 
have much value for traditional baseball statistics, but focuses on on-base percentage and 
slugging percentage (Beneventano et al., 2012). The most famous use of sabermetrics took place 
in 2002 when Billy Beane, general manager of the Oakland A’s, developed advanced models to 
predict player performance in order to determine which players were undervalued (Armstrong, 
2012). Once added to the roster, these players allowed the team to go on a 20 game winning 
streak, and win a division championship with one of the MLB’s lowest payrolls (“Oakland 
Athletics Team History,” 2015). 
 Since this historic accomplishment by Beane, teams within the MLB and NBA have 
adopted similar tactics using advanced statistics to inform personnel decisions during the season. 
The focus of this paper will be to determine if analytic decision makers in the MLB and NBA see 
an increase in winning percentage in all games before and after acquiring players during the 
season. Only teams that had winning records over the past four seasons will be considered in 
order to control for teams that were not actively seeking to win games. It is hypothesized that 
those teams who employ analytic decision makers will be found to have a higher winning 
percentage after player acquisitions than teams that do not. An “analytic decision maker” will be 
defined as someone who makes the final decision on player acquisitions, and who has a 
connection to using advanced statistics through their educational background or through the 
employ of staff with such a background. This decision maker will have no more than five years 
of professional playing and coaching experience in the MLB or NBA. Player acquisition refers to 
player signings, and trades that take place during the regular season. 
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In research conducted at the University of Minnesota, the merits of clinical and 
mechanical judgment were analyzed and compared in order to quantify which way of decision 
making outperformed or underperformed relative to the other (Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & 
Nelson, 2000). Mechanical judgment was defined as any decision made based upon statistics or 
computer programs, and clinical judgment was defined as formal decision making based upon 
subjective methods (Grove et al., 2000). The findings of this study suggested that mechanical 
judgment outperformed clinical judgment on average, and was therefore equal to or superior to 
clinical judgment in most situations (Grove et al., 2000). One limitation of this study is that it 
was conducted over a decade ago, however the current trend in the NBA is to hire staffs that 
have more familiarity with advanced statistics (“NBA Teams That Have Analytics 
Departments,” 2014). This trend seems to support the long-standing notion of the validity of 
using quantitative data or advanced statistics to make informed decisions. 
In the MLB most teams are in favor of hiring general managers that have a more 
statistical approach regardless of that person’s previous playing or coaching experience (Wong & 
Deubert, 2011). Each team may vary the extent to which it makes use of statistical analysis, but 
the new wave of decision makers within the NBA are more open to this approach than their 
predecessors were (Wong & Deubert, 2011). Our paper uses the term “decision maker” to signify 
the person with the final say over player acquisitions because the president of basketball 
operations may supersede the general manager in these decisions as the hierarchy of front office 
positions vary within each NBA franchise (Wong, & Deubert, 2011). One thing that Wong and 
Deubert (2011) make clear in their analysis of NBA general managers is that many have had 
some form of playing experience at either the collegiate or professional level. This fact, in 
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addition to the complexities of the sport of basketball, has led to a much slower adoption of 
emphasizing advanced statistics in major decisions (Wong & Deubert, 2011).   
Research undertaken by Martinez and Martinez (2011) sought to determine the opinions 
of stakeholders in professional basketball on various topics that included the best way to evaluate 
players, the role of qualitative player analysis, and the role of quantitative player analysis. The 
study surveyed 182 participants and included former head coaches, players, journalists, research 
analysts, and bloggers of the ACB Spanish League and EuroBasket. Several of the research 
analysts were known members (or former NBA analysts) of the Association for Professional 
Basketball Research Metrics (APBR) community (Martinez & Martinez, 2011). The most 
relevant finding in this study was that at least fifty percent of the stakeholders agreed that 
intangibles cannot currently be accurately measured by quantitative methods, and that a mixture 
of both qualitative and quantitative methods is desired when evaluating players (Martinez & 
Martinez, 2011). In contrast to the findings of this particular study the number of the teams that 
employ full-time analytics departments in the NBA has grown over the past decade, and cameras 
that are meant to capture aspects of the game for later statistical analysis are now installed in 
every NBA arena (“NBA reaches deal,” 2013).  
  Our research attempts to determine if analytic decision makers improve their teams’ 
winning percentage through player acquisition. The results may be of interest to professional 
basketball teams that wish to analyze the relative success that might accompany hiring an  
analytic decision maker, or personnel that work in a strictly analytic capacity. There has been 
much publicity surrounding the use of analytics in baseball and basketball, but there is currently  
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a lack of evidence to support the notion that using analytics to acquire players is conducive to 
increasing winning percentage. Our research will be a step in this direction, but further analysis 
of specific frameworks used by analytic decision makers in specific player acquisitions would be 
the next step in the process of determining the benefits of using analytics versus more traditional 
methods of decision making. 
Methodology 
Research Design 
We gathered cross-sectional data to determine whether analytic decision makers have a 
higher increase in winning percentage after player acquisitions during the season compared to 
non-analytic decision makers. The presence of the type of decision maker for each team was the 
independent variable, and the change in winning percentage after any player acquisitions was 
considered the dependent variable. 
Data to Collect 
The data we collected were the winning percentages before and after an in season player 
acquisition of teams with a winning percentage above .500 at the end of each of the previous four 
MLB and NBA seasons.  We took the winning percentage the day before any acquisition and 
then the winning percentage for the rest of the season.  Acquisitions were further categorized into 
trades and signings.  If a team made multiple trades we considered that as one acquisition, and 
used the first one to mark the point from which we measured the “after” winning percentage. We 
needed to see how many analytic decision makers were in each league for the past 4 
seasons.  We then determined which league had more analytic decision makers. Analytic 
decision makers are defined as general managers (or presidents of basketball operations) by 
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educational background, and whether or not they employ any advanced statisticians. They were 
not considered analytic decision makers if they had five or more years of professional coaching 
or playing experience.  
The goal of this data was to see if there was an increase or decrease in winning 
percentage when a team with an analytic decision maker made a move during the regular 
season.  There may be other factors that affected winning percentage such as schedule, or the 
quality of competition, but we felt that those factors were roughly equivalent for teams at the end 
of the season.  
Method of Data Collection 
The method of data collection for our research was a secondary data content analysis. We 
collected data regarding player acquisitions, winning percentages, and decision makers from 
professional sports data websites such as www.baseball-reference.com and www.basketball-
reference.com. We also made use of the official websites of the MLB and NBA. We conducted 
web searches on each decision maker of teams that fit our criteria in order to determine their 
relevant educational background, playing or coaching experience, and whether they hired 
analytic staff.  This was done for each decision maker over the past four seasons.  
Population and Sample Size 
The population for this research project was every MLB and NBA front office over the 
last four completed seasons (2010-2014). Each franchise counted as a separate entity on a year-
to-year basis because of possible shifts in philosophy within its front office (for example the  
2013 and 2014 Padres have no relation to each other and are different members of the 
population).  This study sampled the population using stratified random sampling. Only teams 
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from this population who finished the season with a record of .500 or better were sampled. Those 
teams were then be categorized into two groups: teams with analytic decision makers, and teams 
without analytic decision makers.   
The total population of MLB and NBA teams who met the criteria of making an in-
season trade or signing, while finishing the season .500 or better over the last four completed 
seasons in each respective sport was 105 teams. Seeing as the population was so small, this study 
sampled all members of the population making our sample size 105 teams.  
Results 
There were 105 teams in our sample size of which 41 had non-analytic decision makers 
and 64 teams had analytic decision makers.  In total there were 163 acquisitions made; 64 by 
non-analytic decision makers, and 99 by analytic decision makers. The average differences in 
win percentage for acquisitions, trades, and signings for each type of decision maker can be 
found in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Average Change in Winning Percent by Type of Decision Maker 
 Type of Decision Maker  
 Analytic n=64 Non-Analytic n=41 ANOVA significance 
Acquisitions -0.021 (.111 SD) -0.019 (.132 SD) 0.941 
Trades 0.025 (.101 SD) 0.029 (.123 SD) 0.976 
Signings 0.008 (.142 SD) 0.018 (.155 SD) 0.841 
 
Following all acquisitions made during the season, we took the winning percentage the 
day before a signing or trade and then the winning percentage the day of signing or trade for the 
rest of the season, the analytic decision makers saw an average winning percentage decrease of  
0.021 and non-analytic decision makers decreased by .019.  One-way anova testing showed there 
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is no significant difference between the type of decision maker and the difference in win 
percentage after an acquisition, trade, or signing. We tested the effectiveness of the decision 
maker in terms of win percentage by league using the same inferential tests, and found that there 
was no statistical difference between the two variables for either the MLB nor the NBA. 
In order to try to explain these results we tested whether or not more acquisitions were 
being made by one type of decision maker over another during any particular season. The 
average number of acquisitions for each group can be seen in Figure 1.  The averages are similar 
except in the 2014 season, when analytic decision makers had a higher average number of 
acquisitions. There was no statistical significance (p=0.695) between the type of decision maker, 
and the number of acquisitions made per season. 
 
 
Figure 1. Average number of acquisitions per season 
 
Discussion 
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 In this research project we sought to explore the possible relationship between two 
variables: type of decision maker, and the difference in winning percentage following an in-
season acquisition. The focus of the study was to try to provide some insight into whether or not 
one form of decision making was more effective over another during the course of a regular 
season. As opposed to a stakeholder analysis (Martinez & Martinez, 2011) or a study of general 
managers (Wong & Deubert, 2011) we opted to gather secondary data to see if there was hard 
evidence to support either form of decision making. It was originally hypothesized that teams 
with analytic decision makers would see a higher increase in win percentage after an in-season 
acquisition. This stance was based on the study conducted by Grove et al. (2000), which found 
that a quantitative approach to decision making was equal to or superior than a qualitative 
approach to decision making. In addition to Grove’s study, the success of MLB’s Billy Beane 
and his methods of using analytics to build a roster led us to believe that other decision makers 
across the MLB and NBA would be able to capitalize on using analytics during the season 
(Armstrong, 2012).  However, our findings did not support this notion. At this point we cannot 
convincingly argue for one form of decision making over the other.  It may be possible that the 
newly acquired player may need time to adjust to new team and get use to play style of said 
team.  Maybe the moves made by decision makers during the off season are making an impact 
rather than the one during the season.  Analytics may have more of an impact in the MLB than in 
the NBA and therefore canceling each other out.     
Limitations and Recommendations 
 This research project was limited by the amount of access that was available to 
information regarding the inner workings of every NBA and MLB front office. There was no 
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way to be sure as to what extent each decision maker was actually using analytics. Furthermore it 
was difficult to attribute any increase in winning percentage to the actual acquisitions made 
because there were too many variables that we were not able to factor due to time constraints and 
the availability of information. As the study by Martinez and Martinez  
(2011) suggested, the intangible aspects of team sport (more in regard to basketball) are difficult 
to quantify and analyze. Other variables consisted of injuries that took place during each season, 
and the major acquisitions that took place during each off-season of the years that we studied.  
 
One interesting finding was that although analytic decision makers were not quite as 
successful as their non-analytic counterparts in terms of increasing win percentage via in season 
trades, teams with analytic decision makers averaged a higher win percentage before and after 
trades. This indicates that their teams had a higher win percentage over the course of the season, 
which might imply that analytic decision-making is more effective when used in offseason 
acquisitions when there is more time to for them to fully analyze what the proper direction is for 
the team to go in. Due to these findings, comparing the effectiveness of decision maker’s 
offseason transactions could be an interesting area for future research.  
Future research into this subject would benefit from the proprietary information from 
each team in either the MLB or NBA in order to determine how much analytics are being used to 
make in-season acquisitions. This information would have to be obtained going through the 
proper channels for every team, and would be difficult for teams to provide for fear of losing any 
type of competitive advantage that they may or may not have. Signing a nondisclosure 
agreement might be the best way to persuade teams to part with this type of information through 
the form of an interview with the decision maker or analytics staff. 
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to find out whether there was significant evidence 
showing that teams with analytic decision makers experience a greater increase in win 
percentage after in-season player acquisitions compared to teams without analytic decision 
makers. All player acquisitions over the past four MLB and NBA seasons were examined in this 
study. Effect on win percentage was deciphered by calculating the win percentage before the 
team made the acquisition and subtracting it from the win percentage after the team made the 
acquisition. Before the study, we believed there would be significant data supporting analytic 
decision makers having a significantly more positive influence on win percentage via in-season 
acquisitions (trades and signings) and number of acquisitions made than non-analytic decision 
makers.  However the data did not support our hypothesis. Of the four areas studied (player 
acquisitions, trades, signings, and number of acquisitions), there was no significant data favoring 
either analytic or non-analytic decision makers. 
The results were surprising because they do not provide evidence for the current trend of 
hiring analytic decision makers. This study’s findings are intriguing because, in relation to in-
season acquisitions, we would expect teams to see a similar level of improvement after 
acquisitions regardless of the type of decision maker they employ. This is very important 
information for owners to know when deciding on a decision maker because if they are hiring 
based off of the criteria of someone who can make key in-season acquisitions that will help the 
team down the stretch run towards the playoffs then they don’t necessarily have to focus on 
hiring someone analytical. This broadens their options significantly and can allow the team to 
feel more confident hiring a non-analytic candidate who is an all-around better fit for the 
organization. 
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So why is it that team’s continue to hire analytic decision makers? For the four years 
analyzed in our study, teams with analytic decision makers on average had a higher win 
percentage at the end of the season (.600) than teams with non-analytic decision makers (.584). 
Seeing as no tests were done in this study to measure the significance of the end of the season 
win percentage data, this would be a very interesting focus for future research. It may turn out 
that the effectiveness of analytic decision makers is most greatly noticed when examining 
acquisitions made in the off-season, which could be the reason this type of decision maker 
continues to get hired more frequently. There is still plenty of research to be done in this field 
and it will be interesting to examine how future studies compare to this one. 
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